Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)

1967

Artie Missie Banks v. Roy Shivers : Plaintiff and
Appellant's Brief

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.Karras, Van Sciver & Yocom by Robert Van Sciver; Attorneys for
Plaintiff-Appellant
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Banks v. Shivers, No. 10854 (1967).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/4037

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ARTIE MISSIE BANKS,
Plaintiff and A.ppellmnt,
vs.

ROY SHIVERS,
Defendant and Respondent.

Case No.
108541

Plaintiff and Appellant's Brief
Appeal from Judgment of the
First District Court for Cache County, Utah
Honorable Lewis Jones, Judge

KARRAS, VAN SCIVER & YOCOM
By ROBERT VAN SCIVER
661 East Fourth South
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for PlaiDtiff-AppellQ.t
OLSON & HOGGAN

By L. BRENT HOGAN

56 West Center
wgan, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant·Respondent '

"RINTl:D BY BAl.T I.AKI: TIMISB

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

STATElYIENT OF THE KIND OF CASE ____

I

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT____

I

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL --------------------

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS----------------------------------

2

ARGVMENT ---------------------------·································
5
POINT I
THE INSTRUCTION BY THE COURT
TO THE JURY DEFINING A CIVIL ASSAULT 'VAS AN ERROR IN LAW AS IT
INCORRECTLY DEFINED AN ASSAULT. 5
POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
AS THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE
JUSTIFIED A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF
THE PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE
DEFENDANT. ··-··-···--···-···-···-···-----·-·-·····-···············
9
CONCLUSION --··---··------···-··----·-··-········-·-···············
12
1

Cases Cited
Ganaway vs. Salt Lake Dramatic A.$sociation
17 Utah 37, 65 P830 (1898) ------------------.:...
State vs. Barkas, 65 P2d ll30 (1937)
......

"

'

.

~·

Phoenix vs. Carey, 108 So 2d 268 ------·-···················lli

Texts Cited

American Law Institute Restatement, Law of Torh
Section 21 Subsection 1 ----------------·-···················
American Jurisprudence 2nd Volume 6 Section 110 ;
Prosser, Law of Torts 2nd Edition (1955)
Section 10 ·-----------------------------------------------···-·········1
American Law Reports 6 997, Annotation ................ 111

Statutes Cited
Title 76, Chapter 7, Section 1 -----------------------------·······j

11

IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE S'TATE OF UTAH
ARTIE MISSIE BANKS,
'
Plaintiff and Appellant, J
vs.
HOY SHIVERS,
Defendant and Respondent.

(Case No.
~ 10854

Plaintiff and Appellant's Brief
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action brought for damages for an alleged
assault and battery inflicted upon the plaintiff by the
defendant.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The matter came regularly on for trial before The
Honorable Lewis Jones in the First Judicial District,
County of Cache, the 29th day of December, 1966. The
matter was tried to a Jury and the Jury's verdict was
in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff
1

on plaintiff's Complaint, and in favor of the 1·
.
P aintiu
an d agamst the defendant on defendant's c
.
ounte
claim, no cause of action. Judgment was entered . ·
.
00~
verdict.
1

The plaintiff filed a Motion for a New Trial"'
the 4th day of January, 1967. Said motion was setf
oral argument on the 16th day of January ' 1967, an.'
.
taken under advisement. Counsel for plaintiff wi
requested to submit a Memorandum of law and a repti
Memorandum was filed by counsel for defendant. Ti,
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial was denied by tb
court on the 6th day of February, 1967.
111

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff-Appellant seeks a decision from tfii,
Court reversing the lower Court's ruling denying trr
Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial and a judicial dete1
mination of the definition of a civil assault in this Statt

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This is an Appeal by the plaintiff from a Jur:
verdict entered in favor of the defendant and agairu
the plaintiff on plaintiff's complaint, no cause of action
The Record of Appeal consists of the pleadings an
material contained in the appeal cover, the depositiofr
of the parties plus LuAnn Martinez, and the trial tm
script.
1

2

From the trial transcript, the following facts appear:
The incident in question occurred on or about the
1gth day of April, 1966, in an apartment located on
the Utah State University Campus designated particularly as Triad 13 I.
The defendant in the company of Henry King
came to the plaintiff's apartment for the purpose of
having the plaintiff's roommate, Mary Graham, cook
them some chicken.

C pon arriYing in the apartment, the plaintiff was
studymg at a table and the defendant commenced studying on a couch across the room from the table ..Mr.
I\. ing and Mary Graham removed themselves to the
kitchen area of the apartment and proceeded to cook
the chicken.
Thereafter, LuAnn Martinez entered the apartment. The defendant walked to the counter separating
the living room area from the kitchen area and picked
up some book markers. The plaintiff asked the def endant to put them down which the defendant did, and
plaintiff put them in her room and returned to the
table.
Mr. Shivers said,
"Is there anything else on this counter that
( T pg. 16 ) .

. yours.?"
is

The plaintiff said,
"If there is, just don't touch and I won't yell
at you or anything. Don't touch anything."
3

The plaintiff testified that defendant ap
.
peared t1
be upset and he said,
'
"I ought to knock you up side of you,1
head."
napp) ,
The defendant then moved toward the 8 .
plaintiff in a rapid movement clapping his hands e:::~·
near her face. The plaintiff testified that he bare!:
missed and that she was frightened and upset. (T P',

17}.

~

The plaintiff then arose from her chair and starter]
in the direction of the door where the defendant Wai
headed. The plaintiff asked defendant to leave and lit
ref used and leaned his chest against the plaintiff. TJi,
plaintiff struck defendant in the mouth and the dP
fendant pushed or struck the plaintiff in such a manner
that she fell to the floor.
The defendant started in the direction of plaintili
and leaned over, striking her in the face, and grabbea
the hands of plaintiff and the plaintiff attempted to kicli
the defendant in the groin. At this point Henry Kini
interfered and restrained the defendant. Plaintiff aro~e
and retreated toward the wall by the kitchen. The
defendant, after an interval of time had elapsed, in
which he got "madder and madder" (T pg. 82) then
grabbed the plaintiff by the throat and pushed her
back against the wall.
Plaintiff testified the defendant had been chokin~
her and it was hard for her to breathe while against
the wall.
4

ARGUMENT
POINT I

THE INSTRUCTION BY THE COURT
TO THE JURY DEFINING A CIVIL ASSAULT \VAS AN ERROR IN LAW AS IT INCORRECTLY DEFINED AN ASSAULT.
The Court instructed the Jury as follows:
'"An Assault is an unlawful attempt coupled
,vith a present ability to commit an injury on the
person of another."
should be noted that this definition is identical
to the definition of a criminal assault with the exception
of the word "violent". A criminal assault is defined
in Title 76, Chapter 7, Section 1:
[t

"An Assault is an unlawful attempt coupled
with a present ability to commit a violent injury
on the person of another."
It is appellant's contention that the concepts of
civil and criminal assault are not identical. The definitions are not interchangeable and that it was prejudicial and an error in law to instruct the Jury as aforementioned.

This Court in Ganaway vs. Salt Lake Dramatic
Association, 17 Utah 37, 65 P830 (1898), reversed the
trial court which had held for the plaintiff on the
ground, among others, that an assault had been improperly defined. It is of importance to note that the
definition of assault in this case was taken from the

5

laws of 1880 Section 4483. A review
· 0 f thos
e 1aw,
reflects that the definition was taken from the
co d e an d use d as an accurate statement of th I pena1
,

. ·1 t ria
. 1.

e a11 li1

CIVI

The defendant, Salt Lake Dramatic Assoc' ·
Ia1lOii
excepted to the charge as the word "unlawful" '&11
omitted. The record was not clear that the defend :
an,
may not have been prejudiced by the definition. Tht
defendant removed the plaintiff from a reserved sea;
in its theater and did not deny the use of force bu:
rather in its answer suggested it was justified. .
This case is clearly distinguishable from the cast
at bar. In the case at bar, the plaintiff did not haw
verdict in her favor while in the Salt Lake Dramatit
Association case plaintiff did have a verdict in his favor.
A satisfied plaintiff is less likely to complain of the
definition of the alleged tort by which he recovers than
the dissatisfied plaintiff.
The only other case in Utah which by virtue of ar
instruction the Court defines an assault is a criminal
case. Oddly enough, the situation is the reverse. ln
State vs. Barkas, 65 P2d 1130 (1937}, rather than
adopting the criminal definition from the penal code
the Court created a hybrid, half criminal and half civil.
In employing the definition from WORDS AND
PHRASES, the Courts defined simple assault as:
"That which is a threat or attempt to interfere
with one's sense or feeling of physical secur1fy
and to put one in fear for his safety."

6

Had the Court omitted the word "attempt", it
would have accurately defined a civil assault consistent
with the prevailing view.
In the Barkas case, the defendant bitterly assails
the trial court's refusal to instruct on a lesser included
offense to Assault with a Deadly Weapon with Intent
to do Bodily Harm. Refusal to so instruct was held
reversible error. It is interesting to note that the Court
in its reasoning in a criminal case said that a simple
assault could be made out if the defendant intended
to frighten or intimidate the victim. At first glance
it would thus appear that the case law in Utah is in
hopeless irreconcilable conflict unless the Barkas case
supra being the latest statement of the Court is controlling.

The American Law Institute's Restatement of the
Law of Torts in defining a civil assault Section 21
Subsection 1, states:
"An act, other than the mere speaking of
words, which directly or indirectly is a legal cause
of putting another in apprehension of an immediate and harmful or offensive contact renders
the actor civilly liable, if he intends thereby to
inflict a harmful or offensive contact upon the
other or a third person or to put the other or a
third person in apprehension thereof, and the
act is not consented to by the other, and the act
is not otherwise privileged."

American Jurisprudence 2nd Volume 6 Section
110 states that the above definition is the prevailing
view taken in most jurisdictions.

7

The very crux of the civil law for an assa It .
U · lS lir'
an attempted battery, which implies the sw· .
.
but t l1e creation
. of apprehension or f Ing· tha·,
misses,
. .
.
ear in t11t
plamtiff of an off ens1ve contract. It should also b , ·
e no\e11
that apparent ability to consummate the tou 1· .
.
.
~
c 110g ~.
all that is reqmred. 'I he Court instructed the Jury.
the case at bar that present ability should be fou ·d
!'

n.

1.·

Prosser, Law of Torts 2nd Edition (1955) SPc.
tion 10, after adopting the Restatement view c
' fJU1
men ts as follows:
"The interest in f~eedom from apprehensioi
of a ~a!mf~l or offensive contact with the persou
as d1stmgmshed from the contact, itself, is pro
tected by an action for the tort known as ,
assault. No actual contact is necessary, and t\1,
plaintiff is protected against a purely menta.
disturbance of his personal integrity."

,
1

Because criminal statutes use the term "assault
they are frequently misapplied to civil actions as ii
the case at bar and prejudicial when used and incluat
attempted battery.
The initial conduct in this case was a movemem
across the room towards the person of the plainhft.
the clapping of the defendant's hands in close proxim·
ity to plaintiff's face, preceded by the defendant's state·
ment, "I ought to knock you up the side of your napp:
head" ( T pg. 17). This conduct induced fear in thr
plaintiff and a civil assault occurred. But if the criminal
definition were applied, attempted battery, the oppo·
site result could be obtained as the defendant testifiea.

8

''I did not intend to touch her." (T. pg. 78). The
definition given suggests one must intent to hit and be
unsuccessful before an assault occurs. The instruction
places too much emphasis upon the defendant's physical
~10 vement which barely missed its mark. The words
mav be inoffensive by themselves but accompanied by
the. moYement the event takes on a hostile character.
The words and the act together created apprehension
:11 the appellant and an assault had occurred.

POINT II
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
AS THE 'VEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE JUSTIFIED A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF THE
PLAINTIFF AND AGAINST THE DEFENDANT.
The defendant, a 195 lb. male (T. pg. 79) professional football player (T. pg. 86) committed on two
separate occasions in the same incident an assault and
battery upon the female plaintiff. The latter occasion
occurred after the plaintiff's retreat and an elapsed
period of time in which the defendant had an opportunity to reflect upon his action and to deliberately
proceed possessing greatly superior physical ability.
The door to the apartment was close at hand
throughout the incident and the defendant's own testimony (T pg. 77) was such that he could have walked
to the door and presumably left the apartment.

9

The defendant clearly used force which ..
.
w~~~
s1ve as stated by the Restatement (Restatement T. ,'·
.
. .
' O,j,
S ec. 70 1) a person is
not privileged to use a
ny meai,
. h . .
of se If -d e f ense wIuc is mtended or likelv t
··
.
• o cause
bodily harm or confinement in excess of that wnc
i · h1,,
correctly or reasonably believes to be necess
·
.
.
ary tri
his protect10n.
The defendant herein was exces SIVe
· l.
•
use of his force and as such was vindictive under 111,
circumstances.
111

In determining whether any reasonable force wa
used by the defendant claiming to have acted in
defense, the relative physical strength and sex are 1
be taken into consideration. Phoenix vs. Carey, 1u,'
So 2d 268.
,

1

It is appellant's position that at no time did ti
defendant have the right to invoke the defense of seli
defense. The manner of handling a woman might con·
stitute excessive force where it would not if the assaile,J'
party were a man. 6 ALR 997, Annotation.

Clearly, here the defendant was the aggressor ano
he cannot justify his conduct on the ground of sell
defense unless he in good faith withdrew.
An examination of the record does not support:
withdrawal at any time by the defendant, but support1
such a withdrawal by the plaintiff. The initial conduct
in appellant's opinion constituted an assault. The affrai
by the doorway, at best, can be said to be a ~nfl.1:
which the trier of fact resolved against the pla1ntin
10

S lJstantial conflict exists regarding the conduct on the
lioor. However, no conflict exists as to the force employed in directing the plaintiff's person to the floor.
'l],

'fhe latter occasion, upon which the defendant cannot interject the defense of self-defense in an effort
to clothe his conduct in propriety, unequivocally was
;1n assault and battery upon the plaintiff. The previous
,:·xamination of the doctrine of self-defense coupled with
the reading of the record support this contention as to
1he latter occasion of which no conflict in the testimony
existed.
The plaintiff testified ( T pg. 21) that 4-5 min:ites had elapsed from the scuffle on the floor to the
eonunencement of the second half of the incident. LuAnn Martinez testified that less than 1h minute elapsed
IT pg. 37) but the testimony of the witnesses were
unanimous that the plaintiff appeared scared and that
defendant was becoming more upset during the interval
the affray was dormant. The defendant's subsequent
conduct in placing his hands on plaintiff's throat, choking her, and then pushing her back against the wall was
an assault and battery.
The creation of the apprehension in the person
of the plaintiff of a harmful touching coupled with
the actual touching was completed. The interest which
is attempted to be protected by the tort of assault, that
is, the apprehension of a touching and the interest in
the individual in freedom from bodily harm had been
Yiolated. The defendant's conduct here offends the

11

reasonable sense of personal dignity which should!:
respected.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff-appellant seeks to have this couri
rule as a matter of law the definition of an assault"
civil case and the granting of a new trial. Appellai,'
respectfully submits that the defendant's conduct 11 ;
tortious upon the person of the plaintiff and to sushi!
the trial court's denial of a Motion for a New Tn~.
is contrary to the law and evidence.
Respectfully submitted,
KARRAS, VAN SCIVER & YOCOli
Robert Van Seiver
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellan
661 East Fourth South

Salt Lake City, Utah
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